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Abstract
This paper proposes a framework for studying how consumer search frictions
a¤ect retail market structure. In our model single-product rms which supply dif-
ferent products can merge to form a multiproduct rm. Consumers wish to buy
multiple products and value the one-stop shopping convenience associated with a
multiproduct rm. We nd that when the search friction is relatively large all rms
are multiproduct in equilibrium. However when the search friction is smaller the
equilibrium market structure is asymmetric, with single-product and multiproduct
rms coexisting. This asymmetric market structure often leads to the weakest price
competition, and is the worst for consumers among all possible market structures.
Due to the endogeneity of market structure, a reduction in the search friction can
increase market prices and decrease consumer welfare.
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1 Introduction
Many consumers place a high value on one-stop shopping convenience. They are often
time-constrained, and so value the opportunity to buy a large basket of products in one
place.1 Consequently product assortment is an important dimension along which retailers
compete. Over time there has been a steady increase in the size of retail assortments. The
Food Marketing Institute estimates that between 1975 and 2013, the number of products
in an average US supermarket increased from around 9,000 to almost 44,000. At least
part of this increase can be attributed to retailers stocking new product categories.2 For
example Wal-Mart has expanded into pharmacies and clinical services, whilst drugstores
like Walgreens and CVS have started selling fresh food and grocery items. Nevertheless
one striking feature of most retail markets is their persistent heterogeneity large retailers
like Wal-Mart or Amazon often coexist alongside many specialist retailers with much
narrower product selections.3
There is little formal research on how demand-side economies of scope, such as one-stop
shopping convenience, might shape the retail market structure. This is partly because
multiproduct competition is complicated to analyze in environments where consumers
demand multiple products and value one-stop shopping convenience. This paper provides
a tractable consumer search framework to investigate this issue. We nd that the mag-
nitude of consumer search frictions determines whether the equilibrium market structure
is symmetric with all multiproduct rms, or is asymmetric with a mix of single-product
and multiproduct rms. We also examine the welfare properties of di¤erent market struc-
tures, and show that a move towards larger retail assortments is not necessarily benecial
for consumers. In the same vein we show that once endogeneity of market structure is
accounted for, a reduction in search frictions (due, for example, to a shift from traditional
to online retailing) does not necessarily increase consumer welfare.
Our model starts with a situation where there are two products (or product categories)
1Nowadays many consumers buy groceries from big box stores such as Wal-Mart and Tar-
get, instead of more traditional grocery stores. For example, a survey by King Retail Solutions
shows that 77% of consumers bought groceries from a non-traditional grocery store in 2013 (see
http://www.kingrs.com/news/lter/white-paper/study-traditional-retail-categories-are-blurring). Seo
(2015) estimates that the value of one-stop shopping convenience from grocery stores being able to
sell liquor is about $2.52 per trip, or 8% of an average households expenditure on liquor.
2Messinger and Narasimhan (1997) provide empirical evidence that time-saving convenience is the
most important driver of this growth in supermarket store size. (Another important reason is the adoption
of modern distribution technology in the 1980s and 1990s.)
3Indeed anecdotally online markets appear even less symmetric than o­ ine ones e.g. in 2012 Amazon
sold more than its top 12 online competitors combined.
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and each of them is sold by two single-product rms. Each pair of single-product rms
which supply di¤erent products then choose whether to merge and form a multiproduct
rm. This generates one of three possible market structures: either four single-product
rms, or two multiproduct rms, or an asymmetric market with one multiproduct rm
and two single-product rms. Consumers di¤er with respect to their search technology.
Some consumers (shoppers) are able to visit all rms without incurring any cost and
so buy each product at the lowest price available. Other consumers (non-shoppers)
are time-constrained and are only able to visit one (single-product or multiproduct) rm.
It is these non-shoppers who value the one-stop shopping convenience provided by a
multiproduct rm. The fraction of non-shoppers is interpreted as a measure of the search
friction in the market.
We show that a merger has two distinct e¤ects. Firstly, when two single-product rms
which supply di¤erent products merge, they provide one-stop shopping convenience and
so are searched by more non-shoppers (a search e¤ect). Secondly though, the merger
also changes market structure and inuences price competition (a price competition
e¤ect). We show that when the rst pair of single-product rms merge, this leads to an
asymmetric market structure and softens price competition. This is because the resulting
multiproduct rm focuses more on exploiting its one-stop shopping convenience through
higher prices, which further relaxes competition with the remaining two single-product
rms. (In fact, all rms in our model benet from this rst merger.) Consequently the
price competition e¤ect works in the same direction as the search e¤ect, and so there is
no equilibrium with four single-product rms. More interestingly, the size of the search
friction determines whether or not a second merger occurs. When the second pair of
single-product rms merge, they win back some non-shoppers, but the resulting market
structure with two multiproduct rms also intensies price competition relative to the
asymmetric case. In other words, the price competition e¤ect now works against the
search e¤ect. The price competition e¤ect dominates and so the equilibrium market
structure is asymmetric  if and only if the search friction is relatively low. Thus our
model is able to generate both symmetric and asymmetric market structures, depending
upon the size of consumer search frictions in the market.
By comparing the three possible market structures, we nd that the asymmetric mar-
ket structure is the worst for consumers and often the best for industry prot. This
nding has two implications. First, it indicates that a merger between two rms which
supply di¤erent products can harm consumers, even if it does not reduce the number of
competitors in each product market. In antitrust parlance this is called a conglomerate
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merger.4 Our model suggests that if there are search frictions on the demand side, a con-
glomerate merger can be anti-competitive. (We discuss this point further in the related
literature section, below.) Second, our result also suggests that reducing search frictions
does not necessarily harm rms and benet consumers. This is because when the search
friction becomes smaller, the market structure can switch from a symmetric one with all
big rms to an asymmetric one with both big and small rms. This indirect e¤ect on
market structure can work against and even dominate the direct e¤ect of reducing search
frictions on rms and consumers. Therefore our study suggests that a welfare assessment
of a change in search frictions (e.g. due to a move towards online retailing) should take
into account its impact on market structure.
These main insights continue to hold in two extensions which are (i) allowing non-
shoppers to be able to visit more than one rm by paying a search cost, and (ii) considering
more than two pairs of rms. We also consider two alternative models: one with a non-
merger framework where rms can choose their product ranges directly, and the other
where rms sell di¤erentiated products and consumers engage in sequential search. The
main result that an asymmetric market structure arises in equilibrium when the search
friction is relatively small remains true in all these variants of the model.
Related literature: Our benchmark search model with homogeneous products builds
on Varian (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983) which introduce di¤erentially informed
consumers, whilst our alternative search model with di¤erentiated products builds on
Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999). (These are the two most common
approaches to avoid the Diamond, 1971 paradox.) These papers only study single-product
search. We extend them to the multiproduct case where consumers need and rms (may)
supply multiple products.
There is a growing literature on multiproduct consumer search. Lal and Matutes
(1994) show that multiproduct search can lead to loss-leader pricing when some prod-
ucts are advertised. McAfee (1995) and Shelegia (2012) examine when and how multi-
product rms correlate their prices across products when consumers are heterogeneously
informed.5 Zhou (2014) investigates how multiproduct search generates a joint search ef-
4There are two types of conglomerate merger. One involves rms producing totally unrelated products
e.g. steel and tissues. The other involves rms producing complementary products, or products which
belong to a range of products that are generally purchased by the same set of consumers. (See for example
the EU guidelines on non-horizontal mergers.) The merger discussed in our paper is of the second type.
5See also Baughman and Burdett (2015) and Kaplan et al. (2015) for more recent work in this
direction. The former shows that assuming no consumer recall can greatly simplify the analysis of
multiproduct search with price dispersion. The latter o¤ers a search model with high and low valuation
consumers which can explain relative price dispersion across retailers.
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fect, which creates complementarity between physically independent products, and leads
to lower prices compared to the case with single-product search. Rhodes (2015) studies
the relationship between the size of a retailers product range, its pricing, and its adver-
tising decision. He shows that a multiproduct retailers low advertised prices can signal
low prices on its unadvertised products. However all these papers assume an exogenously
given market structure where each rm sells the same range of products. We depart from
this literature by endogenizing market structure, and show that an asymmetric market
structure can emerge as an equilibrium outcome.
There is also research on multiproduct rms and endogenous market structure when
consumers have perfect information about rm o¤erings. Typically these papers consider
a duopoly model where each rm can choose which varieties of a product to supply. The
varieties are either horizontally di¤erentiated (e.g. Shaked and Sutton, 1990), or vertically
di¤erentiated (e.g. Champsaur and Rochet, 1989), or both (e.g. Gilbert and Matutes,
1993). However in these papers there is no notion of one-stop shopping convenience,
and moreover an asymmetric market with both large and small rms does not usually
arise in equilibrium. (See Manez and Waterson, 2001 for a survey of this literature.)
There are also papers on multiproduct competition which introduce shopping frictions
whilst maintaining the assumption of perfectly informed consumers. However they assume
either an exogenous symmetric market where two rms supply the same range of products
(e.g. Lal and Matutes, 1989, Klemperer, 1992, and Armstrong and Vickers, 2010), or an
exogenous asymmetric market where one big rm coexists with a competitive fringe of
small rms with a narrower product range (see Chen and Rey, 2012).6
Our paper is also related to the literature on bundling and market structure. Another
potential advantage of forming a multiproduct rm is the ability to use more advanced
pricing strategies such as bundling. However if all single-product rms merge and form
multiproduct rms, the resulting bundle-against-bundle competition is often erce and
harms all rms. As a result an asymmetric market structure can arise in equilibrium.
Nalebu¤ (2000) and Thanassoulis (2011) make this point in di¤erent settings with prod-
uct di¤erentiation. We argue that even if multiproduct rms do not use bundling (e.g. in
many retail markets such as the grocery industry we do not observe store-wide bundling),
the existence of search frictions can still favor a multiproduct rm and generate an asym-
metric market structure. Our model also predicts that a symmetric market with all big
rms can arise in equilibrium, which is not the case in the above two papers.
6See also Johnson (2014) for a multiproduct competition model where the market friction is that
consumers are boundedly rational and make unplanned purchases. Section 3 of his paper considers an
asymmetric market where one rm is exogenously able to carry more products than another.
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Also related is the literature on agglomeration. Baumol and Ide (1956) argue that
larger retailers may attract more demand, because consumers are more willing to incur
the time and transportation costs necessary to visit them. Stahl (1982) shows that due
to a similar demand expansion e¤ect, single-product rms have an incentive to co-locate
(e.g. in a shopping mall) provided their products are not too substitutable. In a search
environment rms may locate near each other either to o¤er consumers a higher chance
of a good product match (Wolinsky, 1983), or as a way of guaranteeing consumers that
they will face low prices (Dudey, 1990 and Non, 2010). Moraga-González and Petrikait·e
(2013) show that when a subset of rms with di¤erentiated versions of a product merge
and sell all their products in a single shop, they become prominent and are searched
rst by consumers. However in all these papers consumers buy only one product, and so
any one-stop shopping convenience does not arise from consumersneed to buy multiple
products. Nevertheless this is an important feature of many retail markets.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on conglomerate mergers. Since
conglomerate mergers do not eliminate competitors and may generate cost synergies,
economists and policymakers (especially in the US) often hold a benign view (see Church,
2008 for a survey). However our model shows that conglomerate mergers (which involve
rms producing products needed by the same set of consumers) have a potential anti-
competitive e¤ect. In independent and concurrent work, Chen and Rey (2015) examine
conglomerate merger using a di¤erent framework. They nd that conglomerate merger
can also soften price competition, but that it benets consumers (at least when bundling
is infeasible). In addition, due to their modelling assumptions a second conglomerate
merger is never protable because it leads to Bertrand competition.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines a benchmark model, char-
acterizes price distributions in various market structures, and solves for the equilibrium
market structure. Section 3 considers various extensions and shows the robustness of the
main results from the benchmark model, and Section 4 concludes. All omitted proofs are
available in the appendix.
2 A Benchmark Model
A unit mass of consumers is interested in buying two products 1 and 2. Each consumer
has unit demand, and is willing to pay up to v for each product.7 Initially there are four
single-product rms in the market: two of them, denoted by 1A and 1B, sell a homogenous
7The analysis can be extended to allow for elastic demand without changing the main result. The
details are available upon request.
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product 1, and the other two, denoted by 2A and 2B, sell a homogenous product 2. The
marginal cost of supplying each product is normalized to zero.
As we describe in more detail below, it is too costly for some consumers to visit multiple
rms, and so they would benet from the emergence of multiproduct rms which supply
both products. We consider a two-stage game. In the rst stage, each pair of rms
(1k,2k), k = A;B, which supply di¤erent products, has the opportunity to merge and
form a multiproduct rm.8 Their merger decisions can be simultaneous (in which case we
focus on pure strategy equilibria) or sequential. We assume that merger is costless and
does not a¤ect the marginal cost of supplying each product.9 In the second stage, after
observing the market structure rms simultaneously choose their prices and consumers
search and make their purchases. We assume that multiproduct rms do not use bundling
and charge separate prices for each product.10
Consumers di¤er with respect to their search technology. A fraction  2 (0; 1) of
consumers are shoppers, who can search and multi-stop shop freely and so will buy each
product at the lowest price available. A shopper randomizes if indi¤erent about where to
buy a particular product. The remaining fraction 1    of consumers are non-shoppers,
who can visit only one rm (but can do so costlessly). Non-shoppers observe each rms
product range, but do not observe prices when deciding which rm to visit.11 Instead they
form (rational) expectations about each rms pricing strategy, and visit the rm which
they believe will give them the highest expected payo¤. We assume that a non-shopper
randomizes when indi¤erent between visiting two or more rms. Once they visit a rm
they observe all its prices and make their purchase decisions. Each rm sets its price(s)
to maximize expected prots, given consumer search strategies and other rmspricing
strategies.
Some remarks on our modeling approach. We have assumed that non-shoppers cannot
search beyond the rst visited store. This implies that when there are no multiproduct
8Or equivalently one rm has the opportunity to acquire the other. We assume that horizontal merger
between two rms selling the same product is not permitted (or is too costly), for instance due to antitrust
policy.
9In practice mergers may be costly to propose, but could also generate economies of scope and therefore
long-term cost savings. We assume this away to highlight the e¤ect of one-stop shopping convenience.
However introducing this into the model would not change the main qualitative insights.
10Given multiproduct rms charge separate prices for each product, our model is actually isomorphic
to a game of store location choice, where each pair of single-product rms which supply di¤erent products
can choose whether to locate together (e.g. in a shopping mall) or stay separately.
11The assumption that product range is observable but price is not is plausible in many cases, because
prices tend to change frequently whereas product ranges are more stable.
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rms in the market, non-shoppers can only buy one product even though they want
both. This is an extreme way to introduce one-stop shopping convenience from having
multiproduct rms. A less extreme approach would be to allow non-shoppers to search
more rms if they pay a search cost. One way to do that is to have non-shoppers search
sequentially as in for example Stahl (1989). However this is complicated to analyze
in a multiproduct context, because typically there are multiple mixed-strategy pricing
equilibria which are not outcome equivalent, and moreover their characterizations are
complex (see McAfee, 1995). In Section 3.1 we discuss an alternative way to allow non-
shoppers to buy both products, and show that the main insights from the benchmark
model remain unchanged.
We are using a merger framework to study endogenous retail market structure. There
are many examples where retailers expand their product ranges by acquisitions or mergers.
For example, in the UK Amazon acquired LoveFilm to create a one-stop service for video
streaming, DVD rental, and books. Very recently Sainsburys o¤ered to acquire Argos
to create a combined food and non-food retailer, with the hope of gradually relocating
Argos stores into Sainsburys supermarkets. Of course an alternative modelling approach
to endogenize market structure would be to allow each rm in the market to directly
choose which products to stock. We explore such a model in Section 3.3 and show that
the main insights from our merger model continue to hold. However the merger framework
captures those insights in a much more parsimonious way.
2.1 Pricing under di¤erent market structures
We rst solve for equilibrium at the second stage of the game. There are three market
structures we need to consider: (i) if no merger has occurred, a market with four indepen-
dent single-product rms, (ii) if only one pair of rms has merged, an asymmetric market
with one multiproduct rm and two single-product rms, and (iii) if both pairs of rms
have merged, a symmetric market with two multiproduct rms.
As a preliminary step, we rst consider a simpler game where two single-product
rms sell an identical product, some consumers are captive(able to buy from only one
exogenously given rm) and others are non-captive(able to buy from either rm). The
following lemma reports equilibrium pricing in this game.12
Lemma 1 Consider a simultaneous pricing game between two rms A and B which sup-
ply a homogenous product at zero cost. Let Nk be the mass of consumers who can only
12The results in Lemma 1 are not new (but are stated here for completeness), and can be found in
Varian (1980), Narasimhan (1988), and Baye et al. (1992).
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buy from rm k = A;B. Suppose NA  NB  0 with at least one strict inequality. Let
S > 0 be the mass of consumers who can buy from either rm.
(i) There is no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
(ii) If NA = NB = N > 0, the unique equilibrium is that each rm charges a random
price drawn from the atomless price distribution
F (p) = 1  N
S

v
p
  1

(1)
which has support [p; v] with
p =
N
N + S
v : (2)
Each rm earns Nv.
(iii) If NA > NB  0, the unique equilibrium is that rm A charges a random price drawn
from a price distribution FA(p), where
FA(p) = 1 +
NB
S
 

NB
S
+ 

v
p
(3)
for p 2 [p; v) with
p =
NA
NA + S
v (4)
and FA(p) has a mass point at v of size
 =
NA  NB
NA + S
; (5)
while rm B charges a random price drawn from the atomless price distribution
FB(p) = 1  NA
S

v
p
  1

(6)
which also has support [p; v). Firm A earns NAv and rm B earns (NB + S)v.
As usual the two rms randomize over their price, because they face a trade-o¤ be-
tween pricing low to attract non-captives, or pricing high to exploit captives. Lemma 1
implies that rmsprice distributions can be ranked in a simple way. Firstly when the two
rms have the same number of captives (i.e. NA = NB) they use the same price distrib-
ution. Secondly when one rm has more captives than the other, for example NA > NB,
equations (3), (5) and (6) imply that the two density functions satisfy
fA(p) = (1  )fB(p) (7)
for p 2 [p; v). This means that rm A charges higher prices than rm B in the sense of
rst-order stochastic dominance (FOSD). Intuitively this is because rm A has relatively
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more incentive to extract surplus from its captive consumers by pricing high, than compete
for non-captive consumers by pricing low.
We now return to our set-up, and use Lemma 1 to study equilibrium pricing in each
of the three possible market structures outlined above, starting with the simple case of
four independent single-product rms.
Lemma 2 Suppose there are four independent single-product rms. Non-shoppers ran-
domly visit one rm, and each rm uses the mixed pricing strategy in Lemma 1(ii) with
N = 1
4
(1  ) and S = . Earn rm earns 1
4
(1  )v.
Proof. Firstly in equilibrium rms 1A and 1B must have the same number of non-
shoppers. Suppose, in contrast, that 1A for example has strictly more non-shoppers than
1B. Using Lemma 1(iii) 1A charges strictly more in the sense of FOSD than 1B, which is
inconsistent with non-shopperssearch behavior. Secondly for the same reason, 2A and 2B
must have an equal number of non-shoppers. Thirdly all four rms must have the same
number of non-shoppers. Suppose, in contrast, that 1A and 1B for example have strictly
more non-shoppers than 2A and 2B. Using Lemma 1(ii) 1A and 1B charge strictly more
in the sense of FOSD than 2A and 2B, which again yields a contradiction. Lastly then,
each rm has 1
4
(1  ) non-shoppers and so the equilibrium outcome is given by Lemma
1(ii) with NA = NB = 14(1  ) and S = .
Another simple case is when the market has two multiproduct rms. It is without loss
of generality to focus on an equilibrium where each rm randomizes independently over
the prices of its two products.13
Lemma 3 Suppose there are two multiproduct rms. Non-shoppers randomly visit one
rm, and each rm chooses the prices of its two products independently using the mixed
pricing strategy in Lemma 1(ii) with N = 1
2
(1 ) and S = . Each rm earns 1
2
(1 )v
from each product.
Proof. The argument that in equilibrium non-shoppers must randomly visit one rm
is similar to Lemma 2. Hence the equilibrium outcome is given by Lemma 1(ii) with
NA = NB =
1
2
(1  ) and S = .
13A rms payo¤ depends only on its rivals marginal price distributions. Therefore for any equilibrium
in which rm i (for i = A;B) uses a joint price distribution Fi (p1; p2), we can construct an alternative
payo¤-equivalent equilibrium in which rm i chooses its two prices independently using the marginal
distributions of Fi (p1; p2).
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In both symmetric market structures non-shoppers visit one rm at random, and
therefore (by Lemma 1) all rms draw their price from the same distribution. However the
price distribution is lower (in the sense of FOSD) in a market with four single-product rms
compared to a market with two multiproduct rms. This is because in the former case
each single-product rm gets only one quarter of the non-shoppers, whereas in the latter
case each multiproduct rm gets half the non-shoppers and therefore has less incentive to
price aggressively to attract shoppers. This is due to the assumption (which we relax in
Section 3.1 below) that a non-shopper can visit only one rm, even if all rms supply a
single product.
Next consider the asymmetric market structure. Suppose that 1A and 2A have merged
to form a multiproduct rm A, but 1B and 2B remain as single-product rms. A non-
shopper chooses between visiting the multiproduct rm and buying both products, for a
payo¤ of
2
Z v
p
(v   p)fA(p)dp ; (8)
or visiting a single-product rm iB (for i = 1; 2) for a payo¤ ofZ v
p
(v   p)fiB(p)dp : (9)
Clearly, other things equal, it is more attractive to visit the multiproduct rm and get
both products. However, on the other hand, we know from Lemma 1 that if more non-
shoppers visit the multiproduct rm than a single-product rm, the multiproduct rm
will on average charge a higher price. Using equation (7) to compare the two payo¤s, we
can state the following result:
Lemma 4 Suppose there is a multiproduct rm A and two single-product rms 1B and
2B.
(i) A non-shopper visits rm i with probability Xi, where
XA =
(
1 if   1
2
1
2(1 ) if  <
1
2
and X1B = X2B =
(
0 if   1
2
1 2
4(1 ) if  <
1
2
:
(ii) Firm A uses the mixed pricing strategy FA (p), and rms 1B and 2B use the mixed
pricing strategy FB (p), both given in Lemma 1(iii), with Ni = (1  )Xi and S = .
(iii) Firm i earns expected prot i on each of its products, where
A =
(
(1  )v if   1
2
1
2
v if  < 1
2
and 1B = 2B =
(
(1  )v if   1
2
1
4
v if  < 1
2
:
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Lemma 4 shows that if there are relatively few non-shoppers (i.e. if   1
2
) they
all buy from the multiproduct rm. However if there are relatively many non-shoppers
(i.e. if  < 1
2
) some of them buy from a single-product rm instead. This prevents
the multiproduct rm from charging too high prices, and thus rationalizes non-shoppers
search behavior by ensuring that the payo¤s (8) and (9) are equal. Nevertheless the
multiproduct rm still attracts a disproportionate share of non-shoppers, because it o¤ers
them one-stop shopping convenience. One implication of this is that for all  2 (0; 1) the
multiproduct rm charges higher prices (in the sense of FOSD) than its single-product
rivals. This prediction may not t the casual observation that large retailers are often
cheaper than small ones. Remember, however, that to highlight the e¤ect of one-stop
shopping convenience our model has assumed away any possible cost synergy from the
merger. In reality larger retailers may enjoy economies of scale, and also be able to
extract better deals from upstream suppliers. This may lead them to charge lower prices
on average.
Finally, for convenience, Table 1 summarizes per-product prot in each of the three
market structures. Here we also report total welfare as well as its components industry
prot and aggregate consumer surplus. One useful observation is that the asymmetric
market structure tends to lead to the weakest price competition, in the sense that it is the
worst for consumers, and it is the best for industry prot whenever  > 1
4
. The reason
is that in the asymmetric market the multiproduct rm gets a disproportionate share of
the non-shoppers, and so charges high prices; by strategic complementarity, this induces
the two single-product rms to set relatively high prices as well.14
4 sp rms 2 mp rms
asymmetric
(  1=2)
asymmetric
( < 1=2)
Per product prot 1
4
(1  )v 1
2
(1  )v A : (1  )v
B : (1  )v
A : 1
2
v
B : 1
4
v
Industry prot (1  )v 2(1  )v 2(1  2)v 3
2
v
Consumer surplus 2v 2v 22v v
Total welfare (1 + )v 2v 2v (3
2
+ )v
Table 1: Prot and welfare comparison across market structures
14Wilson (2011) nds a similar market segmentation e¤ect in a di¤erent context, where a single-product
rm strategically makes it harder for consumers to search it.
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2.2 Equilibrium market structure
We can now examine the equilibrium market structure when both pairs of rms (1A,2A)
and (1B; 2B) have the opportunity to merge before engaging in price competition. Using
our earlier results, we can state that:
Proposition 1 (i) When   1
2
the unique (pure-strategy) equilibrium outcome is that
the market has one multiproduct rm and two single-product rms.
(ii) When  < 1
2
the unique equilibrium outcome is that the market has two multiproduct
rms.
Intuitively a merger between a pair of rms leads to two di¤erent e¤ects. Firstly
there is a search e¤ect: the merging rms o¤er one-stop shopping convenience and so
become more attractive to non-shoppers. Consequently the merged entity is searched by
more non-shoppers. Secondly though, there is a price competition e¤ect: the merger
changes the market structure and hence the intensity of competition. As discussed earlier,
at an industry level the asymmetric market structure typically leads to the softest price
competition.
Proposition 1 can then be explained as follows. There is no equilibrium with four
single-product rms, because if one pair deviates and merges, both e¤ects work in their
favor i.e. they secure higher demand and soften overall competition.15 (In fact Table 1
shows that the remaining single-product rms also benet from the rst merger.) However
if the second pair contemplates merging they face a trade-o¤, since a merger restores
symmetry and so intensies competition. When there are relatively many shoppers ( 
1
2
) the second pair of rms do not merge, because it is more important to avoid strong
competition for the shoppers. Hence the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric, even
though rms start o¤ symmetric.16 However when there are relatively many non-shoppers
( < 1
2
) the second pair of rms do merge, because it is more important to capture a high
share of the non-shoppers. Hence the equilibrium market structure is symmetric.
Corollary 1 Compared to the initial situation with four single-product rms, the equilib-
rium market structure in Proposition 1 results in strictly higher welfare and rm prots,
but (weakly) lower consumer surplus.
15Of course if we assume that merger involves a su¢ ciently high xed cost, then the initial situation
can remain as an equilibrium outcome.
16Notice that if the two pairs of rms make their merger decisions simultaneously, there are two
asymmetric pure-strategy equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium.
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The market outcome with merger is better for total welfare due to a positive market
coverage e¤ect: non-shoppers generate more surplus when they visit a multiproduct rm
and buy two products instead of one.17 The market outcome also increases each rms
prot: price competition is weaker, either because of the resulting asymmetric market
structure (when   1
2
), or because more non-shoppers visit each multiproduct rm
(when  < 1
2
). However consumers are made worse o¤ because they pay higher prices
on average, and this (weakly) dominates the fact that non-shoppers can now buy both
products.
Finally, notice that the fraction of non-shoppers (i.e. 1   ) is a measure of search
frictions in this baseline model. Interestingly once we endogenize market structure, a
higher search friction does not necessarily harm consumers. This is shown graphically
in Figure 1 below, which plots for v = 1 total welfare (the top horizontal line), industry
prot (the thick solid lines), and aggregate consumer surplus (the dashed lines) against
1   . Intuitively when 1     1
2
the market structure is asymmetric, and a larger
search friction relaxes competition to the detriment of consumers but the benet of rms.
However around the point  = 1
2
the market structure changes and becomes symmetric
with two big multiproduct rms, such that competition intensies and consumer surplus
jumps up and industry prot jumps down in the search friction. However total welfare is
constant because demand is inelastic.18
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
1-alpha
Figure 1: Welfare and the search friction
17Notice that in the current setting with inelastic demand, the price competition e¤ect of merger does
not a¤ect total welfare.
18When demand is elastic, total welfare changes with 1   in a similar way as do the dashed lines in
Figure 1.
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3 Extensions and Robustness Discussion
This section shows that the main insights from the benchmark model are robust to various
extensions.
3.1 Allowing non-shoppers to multi-stop shop
We now relax our earlier assumption that non-shoppers can only visit one rm (and so
can only buy one good when all rms are single-product). To make this extension simple,
we assume that at the beginning of the pricing game (in each possible market structure)
non-shoppers can choose to either (i) visit one (single-product or multiproduct) rm at
zero cost, or (ii) visit two single-product rms (if available) at a cost s > 0. The model
is otherwise the same as before. (Our modeling approach here is therefore ruling out the
possibility that non-shoppers can visit two multiproduct rms, or one multiproduct rm
and one or two single-product rms. This greatly simplies the analysis and captures
the idea that time-constrained consumers want to buy both products but do not nd
it worthwhile to search for lower prices.) Notice that we may loosely interpret s as a
measure of one-stop shopping convenience generated by having a multiproduct rm.
First consider equilibrium pricing in the two symmetric market structures. When
there are four single-product rms, non-shoppers can either visit one rm only or visit
two rms with di¤erent products by paying the search cost s. We focus on the case where
s is small enough such that non-shoppers will visit two rms and buy both products.19
For reasons analogous to those in the benchmark model, each rm must then receive the
same mass of non-shoppers i.e. N = 1
2
(1  ). When instead there are two multiproduct
rms, non-shoppers choose one rm to visit and the model is identical to the one that we
solved earlier, and hence each rm again receives a mass N = 1
2
(1  ) of non-shoppers.
Consequently equilibrium price distributions and per-product prots are now identical
in the two symmetric market structures, and given by Lemma 3 from earlier. However
consumer surplus is strictly higher when there are two multiproduct rms, because non-
shoppers can buy both products without having to pay s.
Second consider the asymmetric market structure. Now non-shoppers have three op-
tions: visit the multiproduct rm only, visit one single-product rm only, or visit both
single-product rms by paying the search cost s. Let X (s; ) and Y (s; ) denote the
fractions of non-shoppers who visit a multiproduct rm and both single-product rms
respectively. (Then the remaining 1   X (s; )   Y (s; ) non-shoppers visit one single-
19See the proof of Lemma 5 in the appendix for further details. Our benchmark model corresponds to
the case when s is su¢ ciently high such that non-shoppers visit one store only.
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product rm only.) We can then show the following:
Lemma 5 Suppose there is one multiproduct rm and two single-product rms. There
exists a unique equilibrium, whose exact form depends on the thresholds ~s () < _s () <
s () which we dene in the appendix.
(i) When   1
2
non-shoppers search either the multiproduct rm, or both single-product
rms. X (s; ) is strictly increasing in s 2 (0; s ()) and satises
s = 2v
2 ~X   1 

~X + 1
"
1 + ~X ln
 
~X
~X + 1
!#
(10)
where ~X  1 

X(s; ), whilst X (s; ) = 1 for all s  s ().
(ii) When  < 1
2
and s 2 (0; ~s ()] non-shoppers search either the multiproduct rm, or
both single-product rms. X (s; ) is strictly increasing in s and satises (10).
(iii) When  < 1
2
and s 2 (~s () ; _s ()) non-shoppers randomize between searching the
multiproduct rm, both single-product rms, and one of the single-product rms.
Y (s; ) = 2X (s; )  1
1   ; (11)
whilst X (s; ) is strictly decreasing in s and uniquely solves
s = v
"
1 + ~X ln
 
~X
~X + 1
!#
: (12)
(iv) When  < 1
2
and s  _s () non-shoppers search the multiproduct rm with probability
X (s; ) = 1
2(1 ) and otherwise search one randomly chosen single-product rm.
The pricing equilibrium in the asymmetric market is more complicated than in the
benchmark model, but the interpretation of Lemma 5 is straightforward. For instance
consider the case where  < 1=2. When s is relatively low (below ~s ()), non-shoppers
randomize over where to shop, with some searching the multiproduct rm, and others
searching both of the single-product rms. As s increases it becomes more attractive to
search the multiproduct rm and avoid paying s. Therefore to ensure that non-shoppers
are willing to randomize, the multiproduct rms relative prices should increase, which is
achieved by having more non-shoppers search it. This explains why X(s; ) increases in
s. However when s is su¢ ciently large (above ~s ()), the multiproduct rm becomes so
expensive that non-shoppers also nd attractive the option of searching only one single-
product rm. Therefore at this point some non-shoppers also search just one single-
product rm. As s further increases, fewer and fewer non-shoppers opt to search both
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single-product rms. Eventually s becomes so large (above _s ()) that no non-shopper
searches both single-product rms. At this point the equilibrium is exactly the same as
in our earlier benchmark model.
Now consider the equilibrium retail market structure:
Proposition 2 There exists an  (s) 2  1
3
; 1
2

(weakly) increasing in s such that:
(i) When    (s) the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric.
(ii) When  <  (s) the equilibrium market structure is two multiproduct rms.
Qualitatively the market structure is the same as in the benchmark model. A rst
merger is always protable, because the merging rms soften competition and attract
higher demand. Intuitively, the merged entity attracts a disproportionate share of non-
shoppers, because it enables them to buy both products without needing to incur the
additional cost s > 0. A second merger is then protable if and only if  is su¢ ciently
low. As in the benchmark model, a second merger has both a price and search e¤ect, with
the latter dominating when there are relatively few shoppers in the market. The result
that the threshold  (s) (weakly) increases in s implies that when one-stop shopping con-
venience becomes more important, it is more likely that the market has two multiproduct
rms. Finally as in the benchmark model, we are also able to show that the asymmetric
market structure is the worst for consumers, but the best for industry prot provided that
 is not too small.
3.2 More rms and heterogeneous consumers
This section extends the benchmark model in two ways. First we consider n  2 pairs of
rms, which we denote by (1j; 2j) for j = 1;    ; n. Second we allow for the coexistence
of both single-product and multiproduct consumers. In particular a consumers valuation
for a product is now v with probability  > 0, and 0 with probability 1 . Valuations are
drawn independently across products and consumers, and do not depend on whether or
not a consumer is a shopper. Therefore 2 consumers want to buy both products, (1 )
want to buy only product i (i = 1; 2), and the rest of the consumers want nothing. The
model and timing are otherwise the same as in the benchmark model from Section 2
(which therefore corresponds to the special case of n = 2 and  = 1).
This extended model is less straightforward to analyze than the benchmark model,
because price competition in an asymmetric market with n > 2 is more complicated. We
show in the Online Appendix that in the asymmetric market structure, non-shoppers
search behavior depends on whether  R k
n
where k denotes the number of multiproduct
rms. When  < k
n
, the ratio of consumers demanding two products to rms supplying
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two products is relatively low. We show that in this case non-shoppers requiring both
products search a multiproduct rm, whilst non-shoppers who want only one product
randomly choose between all rms in the marketplace. This mixing is done in such a way
that all rms use the same price distribution and earn the same prot. We also show that
the case  > k
n
is more complicated and depends upon the exact number of multiproduct
rms. Nevertheless as is intuitive, multiproduct rms charge more in the sense of FOSD,
and non-shoppers wanting only one product buy it from a relevant single-product rm.
The following proposition reports the equilibrium market structure. (Its proof is rele-
gated to the Online Appendix.)
Proposition 3 (i) When n = 2 the equilibrium market structure is asymmetric if  

1+
, and otherwise has two multiproduct rms.
(ii) Suppose n  3 and that a pair of single-product rms choose not to merge when they
are indi¤erent. Then (a) if   1   1
n
, the market has dne multiproduct rms. (b) If
 > 1  1
n
, the market has either n  1 or n multiproduct rms. If  is su¢ ciently large,
there are n  1 multiproduct rms, and if  is su¢ ciently small, there are n multiproduct
rms.
The n = 2 case is thus qualitatively the same as in the benchmark model, except
that the critical threshold for  is now a function of consumer needs. When n  3,
an asymmetric market structure always arises when  is small i.e. when relatively few
consumers are interested in both products, such that demandfor multiproduct rms is
weak. In a similar spirit when  is relatively large, at most one pair of single-product
rms will remain in the market. Whether all rms merge or not depends on the search
friction, in a way that is qualitatively the same as in the baseline model.20
3.3 Allowing rms to choose product ranges
We now consider an alternative way to endogenize market structure. Instead of allowing
single-product rms to merge, we now let each rm in the market directly choose its
product range. We suppose there are three rms A;B;C in the market. (Three is the
minimum number required to generate the asymmetric market structure with at least one
multiproduct rm and one single-product rm for each product.) We normalize the xed
cost of stocking one product to zero, and then let  > 0 denote the incremental xed
20Unfortunately it is di¢ cult to derive a cut-o¤ result on  as we do in the case with n = 2, because a
non-shoppers search problem is much less tractable.
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cost of stocking a second product.21 The rms play a two-stage game where they rst
simultaneously choose product ranges, and then observe their rivalschoices and select
a price for each of their products. In all other respects the set-up is the same as in the
benchmark model.
We focus on deriving conditions under which there exists an asymmetric market struc-
ture with one multiproduct rm and two single-product rms supplying di¤erent products.
Without loss of generality, consider a hypothetical equilibrium where rm A supplies both
products, and rms B and C supply product 1 and product 2 respectively. Using Lemma
4 from earlier, rmsexpected prots in this market structure are
A =
(
2(1  )v   if   1
2
v   if  < 1
2
and B = C =
(
(1  )v if   1
2
1
4
v if  < 1
2
:
There are three possible deviations that we need to check. (i) Suppose a single-product
rm, say rm B, deviates by stocking both products. Then the market has two multi-
product rms A and B and a single-product rm C supplying product 2 only. As we
show in the proof of the proposition below, in this scenario non-shoppers randomly visit
one of the two multiproduct rms, and rm Bs deviation prot is (1   )v   . (ii)
Alternatively suppose the multiproduct rm A deviates by dropping one product, say
product 2. Then the market has two single-product rms A and B supplying product
1 and one single-product rm C supplying product 2. Clearly rm C will charge the
monopoly price v because it is the only supplier of product 2. Hence applying Lemma 1
from earlier, non-shoppers randomize between visiting rm A or rm B, such that rm
As deviation prot is 1
2
(1  )v. (iii) Finally suppose a single-product rm, say rm B,
deviates by dropping its current product and stocking the other instead. Then the market
has one multiproduct rm A and two single-product rms B and C both supplying prod-
uct 2 only. Again since rm A is the only supplier of product 1 it charges the monopoly
price v for product 1. Non-shoppers must then randomize between all three rms, such
that by the usual logic rm Bs deviation prot is 1
3
(1  ) v. Collecting these results
together, we can then state the following:
Proposition 4 If and only if   1
4
there exist () < () such that for  2
[();()] it is an equilibrium that one rm supplies both products and the other two
rms each supply a di¤erent product.
21We can show that without this xed cost, all rms choose to supply both products. This did not
happen in the merger framework because there was an opportunity cost of merging, namely the prot
that could be made by remaining independent.
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Proposition 4 shows that in order to have an asymmetric market structure we require
that   1
4
, and also that the xed cost  is neither too high (otherwise the multiproduct
rm will drop one product) nor too low (otherwise a single-product rm will add another
product). The requirement that   1
4
is consistent with our earlier merger framework, in
which an asymmetric outcome arose if and only if the fraction of shoppers was su¢ ciently
high.
Finally, we can also derive conditions under which any of the other possible market
structures is an equilibrium. The details are lengthy and so we omit them, but there
are two observations. Firstly, for a xed  the number of multiproduct rms tends to
decrease as  increases. Secondly, for a xed (and su¢ ciently small)  the number of
multiproduct rms tends to increase as  decreases (i.e. as the search friction increases).
This is again consistent with our earlier merger framework.
3.4 Product di¤erentiation and sequential search
This section explores an alternative framework with product di¤erentiation and sequential
search. We show that the search friction a¤ects equilibrium market structure in a similar
way to what we found in the homogenous goods case. However we also highlight some
important di¤erences with our earlier results. For example in an asymmetric market
the multiproduct rm charges lower prices than its smaller rivals even if it has no cost
advantage.
We return to the merger framework in Section 2. There are two products 1 and
2, and consumers wish to buy one unit of each. Initially there are four single-product
rms, with rms iA and iB supplying horizontally di¤erentiated versions of product i (for
i = 1; 2). Following Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) we use the random
utility framework to model product di¤erentiation. In particular the match utility of each
product i is a random draw from a common distribution G(u) with support [u; u] and
density g(u). The realization of the match utility is i.i.d. across consumers, products, and
rms, as consistent for example with consumers having idiosyncratic tastes. If a consumer
buys a product with match utility u and pays a price p, she obtains a surplus u  p. We
follow Anderson and Renault (1999) and assume that in equilibrium all consumers buy
both products. This is the case if consumers have a su¢ ciently high basic valuation for
each product i.e. u is su¢ ciently high.
The timing is as before: at the rst stage each pair of rms which supply di¤erent
products simultaneously decides whether or not to merge; at the second stage their merger
decisions are observed by all parties, and prices are chosen. However unlike in the bench-
mark model, consumers all have the same search technology. In particular consumers are
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initially uninformed about rmsprices and match values, although they know the match
utility distribution G(u) and also hold rational expectations about each rms pricing
strategy. A consumer can learn a rms prices and match utilities by incurring a search
cost s > 0; search is sequential and with costless recall. To capture the idea of one-stop
shopping convenience, we assume that the search cost is the same whether a consumer
visits a single-product or a multiproduct rm. To have active search in each possible
market structure, we assume that the search cost is not too high i.e.
s <
Z u
u
(u  u)dG(u) : (13)
As before we rst derive the pricing equilibrium in each possible market structure,
and then examine the equilibrium market structure.
A market with four single-product rms. With four single-product rms, a consumers
search process is separable across the two product markets. In each market we have a
duopoly version of the sequential search model in Anderson and Renault (1999). Consider
the market for product i. We look for a symmetric equilibrium where both rms charge
the same price p0 and consumers search in a random order (i.e. half of the consumers visit
rm iA rst and the other half visit rm iB rst). In symmetric equilibrium the optimal
stopping rule is characterized by a reservation utility level a which solvesZ u
a
(u  a)dG(u) = s : (14)
(The left-hand side is the expected benet from sampling the second rm when the rst
rm o¤ers match utility a.) This equation has a unique solution a 2 (0; u) given the search
cost condition (13). In equilibrium a consumer buys immediately at the rst visited rm
if and only if its match utility is no less than a.
As explained in the appendix, the rst-order condition for the equilibrium price is22
1
p0
= g(a)[1 G(a)] + 2
Z a
u
g(u)2du : (15)
In equilibrium rms share the market equally, and so each rm earns prot 0 = 12p0. For
example when valuations are uniformly distributed with G(u) = u, we have a = 1 p2s
and condition (13) requires s < 1
2
. The rst-order condition then implies that
p0 =
1
2 p2s : (16)
22We can show that if p[1 G(p)] is concave, then the rst-order condition is also su¢ cient for dening
the equilibrium price. See Appendix B in Anderson and Renault (1999) for other conditions which ensure
the existence of a symmetric pure-strategy pricing equilibrium.
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It is depicted as the dashed curve in Figure 2a below.
A market with two multiproduct rms. With two multiproduct rms we have a mul-
tiproduct search model as analyzed in Zhou (2014). Let pm denote the equilibrium price
for each product. We rst report the optimal stopping rule in an equilibrium where both
rms charge the same prices. Consider a consumer who visits rm A rst. After visiting
rm A she faces the following options: stop searching and buy both products, or buy one
product and keep searching for the other, or keep searching for both products. Given
that the search cost occurs at the rm level and consumers have free recall, the second
option is always dominated by the third. If the consumer continues to visit rm B, she
can thereafter freely mix and match among the two rms. Therefore the consumer will
stop searching and buy both products at rm A if the match utilities (u1A; u2A) satisfyZ u
u1A
(u1B   u1A)dG(u1B) +
Z u
u2A
(u2B   u2A)dG(u2B)  s :
(The left-hand side is the expected benet from sampling rm B.) This condition denes
a reservation frontier u2A = (u1A), where () is a decreasing and convex function. If
the match utilities (u1A; u2A) at rm A are such that u2A  (u1A) the consumer buys
immediately, otherwise she searches rm B.
We refer the reader to Zhou (2014) for details of how to derive the equilibrium price.
For a general distribution, the rst-order condition for the equilibrium price is23
1
pm
=
Z u
a
[1 G((u))]g((u))dG(u)+
Z u
a
[1 G(u)]g((u))dG(u)+2
Z
u2(u1)
g(u1)
2g(u2)du ;
where a is dened in (14). In equilibrium rms share the market equally, so each rms
per product prot is m = 12pm. In the uniform distribution example, the rst-order
condition implies that
pm =
1
2  (1
2
   1)s ; (17)
where   3:14 is the mathematical constant. It is depicted as the lowest solid curve in
Figure 2a below.
Zhou (2014) proves that pm < p0 i.e. products become cheaper when single-product
rms merge into two multiproduct rms. This di¤ers from the result in the homogenous
goods model in Section 2, and arises due to the following joint-search e¤ect. Intuitively
when a rm reduces one products price, more consumers who visit it rst will stop
23As explained in Zhou (2014), in general it is hard to derive a simple su¢ cient condition for the
existence of a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium. But for many common distributions (including the
uniform distribution) the rst-order condition is su¢ cient for dening the equilibrium price.
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searching and buy both products. That is, reducing one products price can increase the
demand for the other product as well. Hence the two products behave like complements,
inducing each rm to price more aggressively. This joint-search e¤ect did not arise in the
benchmark model, because no consumers had a sequential search decision to make.
An asymmetric market. Consider the asymmetric case with a multiproduct rm A
and two single-product rms 1B and 2B. Let pA be the multiproduct rms price and pB
be each single-product rms price. We look for an equilibrium where all consumers visit
the multiproduct rm rst. Notice that the cost of visiting each single-product rm is
separable, and so a consumers search decision when she is at the multiproduct rm is
also separable between the two products. This means, for example, that she searches the
single-product rm iB if and only if the multiproduct rms product i has a surplus less
than a  pB, where a is dened in (14). Therefore unlike the case with two multiproduct
rms, there is no joint-search e¤ect here. The multiproduct rm competes with its smaller
rivals in two separate single-product markets where consumers search non-randomly. (As
such the pricing problem is similar to the one studied by Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou,
2009, where one rm is prominent and always visited rst by consumers.)
As explained in the appendix, the rst-order conditions for the equilibrium prices
(pA; pB) are24
pA =
Q()
Q0()
; pB =
1 Q()
Q0()  [1 G(a)]g(a ) ; (18)
where   pB pA, and Q()  1 
R a 
u
[1 G(u+)]dG(u) is the equilibrium demand
for rm As product i. Firm As per product prot is A = pAQ() and each single-
product rms prot is B = pB(1   Q()). This analysis implicitly assumes that all
consumers visit rm A rst and that a  > u. The following result provides a condition
for the system of equations in (18) to have a solution  2 (0; a   u). With  > 0 i.e.
pA < pB, the consumer search order is indeed optimal, because the multiproduct rm
both o¤ers lower prices and provides one-stop shopping convenience.25
Lemma 6 Suppose 1   G is strictly log-concave and condition (13) holds. Then the
system of equations in (18) has a solution  2 (0; a  u).
Therefore under the regularity condition there is an equilibrium in this asymmetric
market where the multiproduct rm is cheaper than its single-product rivals and all
24As in the case with four single-product rms, the rst-order conditions are also su¢ cient for dening
the equilibrium prices if p[1 G(p)] is concave.
25Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) show a similar result without assuming full market coverage,
but they focus on the uniform distribution case.
23
consumers visit the multiproduct rm rst. The prediction that pA < pB is di¤erent to
what we observed in our earlier model with homogenous products. Here, a consumer
visits a single-product rm only if she is unsatised with the multiproduct rms product.
Therefore when a consumer searches a single-product rm, she reveals something about
her preferences. This gives the single-product rm extra market power and induces it to
charge a higher price.26 Nevertheless as we will see below, both pA and pB tend to be
higher than p0 and pm. This is similar to the benchmark model, where price competition
was typically softest when the market structure was asymmetric.
In the uniform distribution example, (18) simplies to
pA =
1
1 [1  a++
1
2
(a2  2)]; pB = 1  1
2
(a ) ;
where a = 1 p2s. It has a unique solution:
pA =
1
16
(3K   5a  5); pB = 1
16
(K   7a+ 9) ;
where K  p17a2   30a+ 49. The prices are depicted as the second highest and the
highest solid curves respectively in Figure 2a below.
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0.6
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b: Prots
Figure 2: Price and prot comparison with di¤erentiated products
Equilibrium market structure. For a general match utility distribution, it is hard to
compare prots and study the equilibrium market structure. Therefore to make progress
26Following this argument, one may conjecture another possible equilibrium in which consumers visit
the two single-product rms rst and they charge lower prices than the multiproduct rm. In order for
this to be an equilibrium, the price di¤erence has to be large enough to compensate consumers for the
extra search cost incurred by visiting single-product rms rst. It is analytically di¢ cult to exclude this
possibility in general, but in the uniform distribution example it can be ruled out.
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we focus on the uniform distribution case with G(u) = u. It can be veried that pA > p0
for any s 2 (0; 1
2
) and so the four prices can be ranked as pm < p0 < pA < pB. (They are
depicted in Figure 2a below.) As in the benchmark model with homogenous products,
the asymmetric market structure generates the highest market prices (and so also the
highest industry prot, given the assumption of full market coverage). Di¤erent from
the benchmark model, here the market structure with two multiproduct rms yields the
lowest market prices and industry prot.
Figure 2b above compares per product prot across market structures. The dashed
curve is 0 (each rms prot in the case with four single-product rms), the middle
(almost horizontal) solid curve is m (each rms per product prot in the case with
two multiproduct rms), and the other high and low curves are respectively A and B
(the multiproduct rms per product prot and each single-product rms prot in the
asymmetric case). A few observations follow: (i) A > 0, so starting from the initial
situation with four single-product rms, each pair of rms have a unilateral incentive to
merge. (ii) B > m if and only if s is less than about 0:092. We can then deduce that if s
is less than 0:092, the (pure-strategy) equilibrium outcome is an asymmetric market with
a multiproduct rm and two single-product rms. On the other hand, if s is greater than
0:092, each pair of rms chooses to merge and the market has two multiproduct rms.
This leads to the lowest industry prot, and so rms end up in a prisoners dilemma.
Therefore at least for the case of a uniform distribution, the search friction a¤ects
market structure in a similar way as it did in the model with homogeneous products.
Again there is a trade-o¤ between the search e¤ect and the price competition e¤ect. In
particular when there is already a multiproduct retailer in the market, a merger between
the remaining single-product rms (i) makes them more prominent in consumerssearch
order, boosting their demand, but (ii) also intensies price competition. The latter e¤ect
dominates when s is small, whilst the former e¤ect dominates otherwise.
As far as consumer surplus is concerned, the market structure with two multiproduct
rms is the best since it leads to the lowest market prices and also saves search costs
for consumers. Numerical simulations show that the asymmetric market structure is the
worst for consumers when s is less than about 0:055, and otherwise the initial situation
with four single-product rms is the worst. Then as in the benchmark model, due to the
endogeneity of the market structure, reducing the search cost does not always improve
consumers surplus.
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4 Conclusion
This paper o¤ers a simple and tractable framework to study equilibrium retail market
structure when consumers buy multiple products and value one-stop shopping conve-
nience. We have shown that the size of the search friction plays an important role in
determining the equilibrium market structure. When search frictions are relatively high
the market has all large rms. When search frictions are relatively low the market is
asymmetric, such that large and small rms coexist. This is because some rms choose
to remain unmerged in order to weaken the amount of price competition in the mar-
ket. Among all possible market structures, the asymmetric market structure delivers the
weakest price competition, and as such minimizes consumer surplus and often maximizes
industry prot. Consequently our model suggests a potential anti-competitive e¤ect of
mergers among rms which supply di¤erent products. Our model also suggests that once
the endogeneity of market structure is taken into account, reducing search frictions does
not necessarily lower market prices and improve consumer welfare.
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Appendix: Omitted Proofs and Details
Proof of Lemma 1. These results can be found in the existing literature. We
provide proofs here for completeness.
(i) The proof is standard and so omitted.
(ii) We rst verify that this is an equilibrium. Since the other rm is using the atomless
price distribution F , a rms prot at p < v is p[N + S(1   F (p))], whilst its prot at
p = v is Nv. The expression for F in (1) equalizes these two prots, such that each rm
is indi¤erent among all prices in [p; v], where the lower bound p in (2) is derived from
F (p) = 0. It is also clear that neither rm has an incentive to charge a price below p.
Varian (1980) proves there are no other symmetric equilibria, whilst Baye et al. (1992)
prove there are no asymmetric equilibria either.
(iii) Again we begin by verifying that this is an equilibrium. Consider rm A rst.
Given that rm B is using the equilibrium strategy FB, As prot at p < v is p[NA +
S(1   FB(p))], whilst its prot at p = v is NAv. The expression for FB in (6) equalizes
these two prots. The lower bound of the support p in (4) is derived from FB(p) = 0.
Firm A is then indi¤erent among all prices between p and v, and also has no incentive to
charge a price below p.
Now consider rm B. Given that rm A is using the equilibrium strategy FA, Bs
prot at p < v is p[NB + S(1   FA(p))]. When p converges to v from below, Bs prot
converges to v[NB + S] since FA has a mass point of size  at p = v. The expression for
FA in (3) equalizes these two prots. Given the mass point of FA, rm B never wants to
charge a price exactly at p = v because it is dominated by a price slightly below v. Hence
the support of FB is open at v.  in (5) is derived from FA(p) = 0. Then rm B has no
incentive to charge a price below p either. Narasimhan (1988) establishes uniqueness of
this equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 4. Notice that in equilibrium each single-product rm must
have the same number of non-shoppers, such that N1B = N2B = NB =
1
2
(1      NA).
Notice also that in equilibrium the multiproduct rm must receive some non-shoppers,
otherwise it would charge lower prices in the sense of FOSD than the single-product rms,
invalidating non-shopperssearch behavior. Notice also that (8) exceeds (9) if and only if
2(1  )  1, NB + S
NA + S
 1
2
: (19)
(i) An equilibrium with all non-shoppers visiting rm A exists if (19) holds with
NA = 1   , NB = 0 and S = . This yields the condition   12 . Firm As prot from
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each product is NAv = (1   )v, and each single-product rms prot is (NB + S) v =
(1  )v.
(ii) The only other possible equilibrium is that a fraction XA 2 (0; 1) of the non-
shoppers visit the multiproduct rm A such that NA = (1 )XA and NB = 12(1 )(1 
XA). According to (19), non-shoppers will be indi¤erent between visiting a multiproduct
rm and a single-product rm only if  = 1
2
, or equivalently
NB + S
NA + S
=
1
2
, XA = 1
2(1  ) :
The requirement XA 2 (0; 1) yields the condition  < 12 . Then NA = 12 and NB =
1
4
(1  2). Firm As prot from each product is NAv = 12v and each single-product rms
prot is (NB + S) v = 14v.
In each case NA > NB so equilibrium price distributions follow from Lemma 1(iii).
Further details for Table 1. (i) Consider four single-product rms. Shoppers buy
two products and non-shoppers one product, hence total welfare is (1+)v. Using Lemma
2 industry prot is (1  ) v. Aggregate consumer surplus is therefore 2v. (ii) Consider
two multiproduct rms. All consumers buy two products, so total welfare is 2v. Using
Lemma 3 industry prot is 2 (1  ) v. Aggregate consumer surplus is therefore 2v. (iii)
Consider the asymmetric market structure and recall Lemma 4. If   1
2
industry prot
is 2(1   2)v, total welfare is 2v, and so aggregate consumer surplus is 22v. If  < 1
2
industry prot is 3
2
v, total welfare is (3
2
+ )v, and so aggregate consumer surplus is v.
Proof of Lemma 5. Notice that Lemma 1 still applies in this extension once non-
shopperssearch behavior is given. As in the benchmark model, the multiproduct rm
must attract a positive mass of non-shoppers, whilst each single-product rm must attract
the same number of non-shoppers. Here it is more convenient to use the price density
function. Let fA (p) denote the density of the multiproduct rms price distribution and
  0 its mass point. Let fB (p) denote the density of a single-product rms price
distribution. A non-shoppers expected payo¤ from searching the multiproduct rm is
2
Z v
p
(v   p) fA (p) dp = 2 (1  )
Z v
p
(v   p) fB (p) dp ; (20)
where the equality follows from equation (7). A non-shoppers expected payo¤ from
visiting both single-product rms is
2
Z v
p
(v   p) fB (p) dp  s ; (21)
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whilst the expected payo¤ from visiting just one single-product rm isZ v
p
(v   p) fB (p) dp : (22)
Step 1. Look for an equilibrium where all non-shoppers search the multiproduct rm
i.e. NA = 1   and NB = 0. Lemma 1(iii) then implies that  = 1  , fB (p) = 1  vp2
and p = (1  ) v. Firstly this equilibrium requires that (20) exceeds (22), which holds if
and only if   1
2
. Secondly this equilibrium also requires that (20) exceeds (21), which
holds if and only if s  s () where27
s () = 2
Z v
p
(v   p) fB (p) dp = 2 (1  ) v

1 +

1  


ln (1  )

:
Step 2. Look for an equilibrium where X 2 (0; 1) non-shoppers search the multiprod-
uct rm, and the other 1 X search both single-product rms i.e. NA = (1  )X and
NB = (1  ) (1 X). Lemma 1(iii) then implies that  = (1 )(2X 1)(1 )X+ , fB (p) = (1 )X vp2
and p = (1 )X
(1 )X+v. Firstly this equilibrium requires that (20) equals (21), which holds
if and only if X satises equation (10) from earlier. It is straightforward to show that
the right-hand side of (10) equals 0 when evaluated at X = 1
2
, is strictly increasing in
X 2 (0; 1), and equals s () when evaluated at X = 1. Therefore a necessary condition for
the equilibrium is that s < s (). (If we let X (s; ) denote the solution to (10), we also
have that X (s; ) > 1
2
and d
ds
X (s; ) > 0 for all s 2 (0; s ())). Secondly this equilibrium
also requires that (20) exceeds (22), which holds if and only if
X (s; )  2  
3 (1  ) : (23)
Thirdly then, if   1
2
an equilibrium exists if and only if s < s () (because (23) is
automatically satised). Fourthly consider  < 1
2
, let ~s () denote the right-hand side of
(10) when evaluated at X = 2 
3(1 ) 2
 
1
2
; 1

, and note that ~s () < s (). Hence for  < 1
2
an equilibrium exists if and only if s < ~s ().
Step 3. Look for an equilibrium where X > 0 non-shoppers search the multiproduct
rm, Y > 0 search both single-product rms, and 1   X   Y > 0 search one single-
product rm i.e. NA = (1  )X and NB = (1 )(1 X+Y )2 . Lemma 1(iii) then implies
that  = (1 )(3X Y 1)
2[(1 )X+] , fB (p) =
(1 )X

v
p2
and p = (1 )X
(1 )X+v. Firstly this equilibrium
27As mentioned in the text, in the case with four single-product rms we assume s is small enough that
all consumers buy both products. This requires that s  R v
p
(v   p) dF (p) = v
h
1 +
 
1 
2

ln

1 
1+
i
,
where F (p) is the price distribution given in Lemma 1(ii) with N = 1 2 . After some algebra this
threshold can be shown to exceed s ().
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requires that (20) equals (22), which holds if and only if equation (11) from earlier holds.
Secondly since Y > 0, equation (11) implies that X > 1
2(1 ) , however this is only
possible if  < 1
2
. Hence  < 1
2
is a necessary condition for this equilibrium. Thirdly
since Y < 1  X, equation (11) implies that X < 2 
3(1 ) . Fourthly, the equilibrium also
requires that (21) equals (22), and this holds if and only if equation (12) from earlier
holds. It is straightforward to show that the right-hand side of (12) is strictly decreasing
in X 2 (0; 1), and (for  < 1
2
) equals ~s () when evaluated at X = 2 
3(1 ) . Let _s () denote
the right-hand side of (12) when evaluated at X = 1
2(1 ) . Still assuming that  <
1
2
, we
note that 2 
3(1 ) >
1
2(1 ) which in turn implies that ~s () < _s (), and after some algebra
we can also show that _s () < s (). Given the previous steps, it is then immediate that
the equilibrium exists if and only if  < 1
2
and s 2 (~s () ; _s ()). (Clearly in addition we
have that X (s; ) is strictly decreasing in s 2 (~s () ; _s ()).)
Step 4. Look for an equilibrium where X > 0 non-shoppers search the multiproduct
rm, and the other 1 X > 0 search one single-product rm. From the benchmark model
we know this is only possible if  < 1
2
, in which case X = 1
2(1 ) . Since NA =
1
2
and
NB =
1
4
Lemma 1(iii) implies that  = 1
2(1+2)
, fB (p) = 12
v
p2
and p = 1
1+2
v. Using this
we can show that (20) strictly dominates (22), whilst (21) strictly dominates (22) if and
only if s > _s ().
Proof of Proposition 2. Firstly we derive prots in the asymmetric market
structure. As is standard the multiproduct rm A earns a per-product prot of A =
NAv whilst a single-product rm B earns B = (NB + ) v. Recall that X (s; ) and
Y (s; ) are the fractions of non-shoppers that visit respectively the multiproduct rm
and two single-product rms. Hence we have that NA = (1  )X (s; ) and NB =
(1  ) 1 X(s;)+Y (s;)
2
. Moreover from the proof of Lemma 5 we know that X (s; ) > 1
2
,
such that NA > NB. This in turn implies that by Lemma 1(iii) we have
 = (1  ) 3X (s; )  Y (s; )  1
2 [(1  )X (s; ) + ] :
Hence we can write
A = (1  )X (s; ) v > (1  ) v
2
; (24)
B = (1  ) v
2

1 X (s; ) + Y (s; ) + 3X (s; )  Y (s; )  1
(1  )X (s; ) + 

: (25)
Secondly there is no equilibrium with four single-product rms. As argued in the
main text, with four single-product rms each product earns prot (1  ) v
2
. Therefore
if one pair deviate and merge, by equation (24) their per-product prot strictly increases.
30
Hence at least one pair merge. Thirdly consider the incentive of the second pair to merge.
As argued in the main text, after a second merger each product earns prot (1  ) v
2
.
Hence the second pair does not merge (such that the market structure is asymmetric) if
and only if (25) exceeds (1  ) v
2
. We now consider several di¤erent cases.
Case 1:   1
2
. From Lemma 5 we have that Y (s; ) = 1 X (s; ). Substituting this
into (25), we nd that B  (1  ) v2 .
Case 2:  < 1
2
and s > _s (). From Lemma 5 we have that X (s; ) = 1
2(1 ) and
Y (s; ) = 0. Substituting this into (25), we nd that B < (1  ) v2 .
Case 3:  < 1
2
and s 2 (~s () ; _s ()). From Lemma 5 we have that Y (s; ) =
2X (s; )   1
1  . Substituting this into (25), we nd that B < (1  ) v2 provided that
X (s; ) < 1, which is clearly true because from the proof of Lemma 5 we have X (s; ) <
2 
3(1 ) < 1.
Case 4:  < 1
2
and s < ~s (). From Lemma 5 we have that Y (s; ) = 1   X (s; ).
Substituting this into (25), we nd that B  (1  ) v2 if and only if
X (s; )  
1   : (26)
Clearly (26) fails for   1
3
because we know from Lemma 5 that X (s; ) > 1
2
. We also
claim that for  2 (1
3
; 1
2
), there exists a threshold s () > 0 such that (26) holds if and
only if s  s (). To see this, recall from Lemma 5 that X (0; ) < 
1  ,
d
ds
X (s; ) > 0
and X (~s () ; ) = 2 
3(1 ) >

1  . The threshold s
 () is calculated by substituting
X = 
1  into equation (10), whereupon we have that s
 () = v(3 1)

(1  ln 2). Notice
that d
d
s () > 0 with lim! 1
2
s () = v (1  ln 2).
The above results then imply the following. (i) Consider s < v (1  ln 2). Cases 2-4
imply that there exists a threshold  (s) = 1 ln 2
3(1 ln 2)  s
v
2 (1
3
; 1
2
) such that B < (1  ) v2
if  <  (s), and B > (1  ) v2 if  (s) <  < 12 . Case 1 further implies that
B > (1  ) v2 when   12 . (ii) Now consider s  v (1  ln 2). When  < 12 we have
s > s (), hence whichever of Cases 2-4 s falls into, they all imply that B < (1  ) v2 .
When   1
2
Case 1 implies that B  (1  ) v2 . Hence, the critical threshold is
 (s) =
(
1 ln 2
3(1 ln 2)  s
v
if s 2 (0; v (1  ln 2))
1
2
if s  v (1  ln 2) :
Proof of Proposition 4.
The proof consists of two parts. (i) We start by deriving the pricing equilibrium after
the rst deviation i.e. when both A and B are multiproduct rms but C sells only product
2. Let F1 be the price distribution that A and B use for product 1. Let F2 be the price
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distribution used by A and B for product 2, and F^2 be the price distribution used by
C for product 2. We rst look for an equilibrium where all non-shoppers randomly visit
one of the two multiproduct rms. Since each multiproduct rm then has half of the
non-shoppers, F1 satises
p

1  
2
+ (1  F1(p))

=
1  
2
v : (27)
Turning to product 2, since the single-product rm C does not have any non-shoppers,
its multiproduct competitorsprice distribution has a mass point at the monopoly price
v. Following the standard logic, F2 and F^2 are determined by the following system of
equations:
p

1  
2
+ (1  F2(p))(1  F^2(p))

=
1  
2
v (28)
p(1  F2(p))2 = 2v ;
where  is the size of F2s mass point. It is straightforward to solve for F2, F^2 and .
One can also check that all three price distributions have a common lower bound. By
comparing (27) and (28), it is easy to see that F^2(p) < F1(p). That is, rm Cs product
2 is more expensive than the multiproduct rmsproduct 1. Therefore all non-shoppers
prefer to visit a multiproduct rm, consistent with our initial conjecture. (Using a similar
logic we can also show that there is no equilibrium where some non-shoppers visit the
single-product rm C.)
(ii) We now derive conditions under which none of the three deviations is protable.
(a) The third deviation is not protable if and only if   1
4
. (b) Suppose   1
2
. The
rst deviation is not protable if (1  )v  (1  )v  , and the second deviation is
not protable if 2(1  )v    1
2
(1  )v. The two conditions simplify to
()  (1  )2v    3
2
(1  )v  () :
(c) Suppose  2 1
4
; 1
2

. The rst deviation is not protable if 1
4
v  (1 )v , and the
second deviation is not protable if v    1
2
(1  )v. The two conditions simplify to
() 

3
4
  

v    1 + 
2
v  () :
Further details on the model with product di¤erentiation.
The case with four single-product rms. To derive the equilibrium price for product i,
suppose rm iA unilaterally deviates and charges a price p00. (i) Half the consumers visit
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iA rst. Those for whom uA   p00  a   p0 stop searching and buy immediately, which
generates demand of 1
2
[1 G(a  p0 + p00)]. Those for whom uA  p00 < a  p0 search rm
iB, but then return and buy from rm iA if uA   p00 > uB   p0. This generates demand
1
2
Pr[uB   p0 < uA   p00 < a  p0] = 12
Z a p0+p00
u
G(uA   p00 + p0)dG(uA) :
(ii) The other half of consumers visit rm iB rst. Since they hold an equilibrium belief
about rm iAs price, they visit rm iA if uB < a. They then buy from rm iA if
uA   p00 > uB   p0. This generates demand
1
2
Z a
u
[1 G(uB   p0 + p00)]dG(uB) :
Adding these three demand components together, one can check that in symmetric
equilibrium each rm sells to half the consumers, and that the slope of demand is
 1
2
g(a)[1   G(a)]   R a
u
g(u)2du. Therefore the rst-order condition for p0 is given by
equation (15).
The asymmetric case. Consider the market for product i. Demand for the multiprod-
uct rms product, if it charges p0A while its single-product rival iB sets the equilibrium
price pB, is
[1 G(a  pB + p0A)] +
Z a pB+p0A
u
G(u  p0A + pB)dG(u) : (29)
This is explained as follows. All consumers visit rm A rst. The rst term is consumers
who nd uA   p0A  a  pB and so buy immediately. The second term is consumers who
nd uA   p0A < a   pB and so search rm iB, but who subsequently return to buy from
rm A because uB   pB < uA   p0A. Demand for rm iBs product, if it charges price p0B
while rm A sets its equilibrium price pA, isZ a pB+pA
u
[1 G(u  pA + p0B)]dG(u) : (30)
This is because all consumers visit rm A rst, and hold an equilibrium belief about rm
iBs price. Therefore they search rm iB if uA   pA < a   pB, and then buy from it if
uB   p0B > uA   pA.
Now dene   pB   pA and
Q()  1 
Z a 
u
[1 G(u+)]dG(u) :
Here Q() is the equilibrium demand for rm A (i.e. (29) evaluated at p0A = pA), and
1 Q() is the equilibrium demand for rm iB (i.e. (30) evaluated at p0B = pB). Due to
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the assumption of full market coverage, they only depend on the price di¤erence . It is
then straightforward to derive the rst-order conditions stated in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 6. Using (18) we get the following equation:
 =
1 Q()
Q0()  g(a )[1 G(a)]  
Q()
Q0()
 () :
Using
Q0() = [1 G(a)]g(a ) +
Z a 
u
g(u+)dG(u) ;
we can show that (0) > 0 if and only if
1
G(a)  1
2
G(a)2
  g(a)[1 G(a)]R a
u
g(u)dG(u)
< 2 :
This inequality holds because
R a
u
g(u)dG(u) =
Z a
u
g(u)
1 G(u) [1 G(u)]dG(u) <
g(a)
1 G(a) [G(a) 
1
2
G(a)2] ;
where the inequality uses the fact that logconcavity of 1   G implies g(u)
1 G(u) increases in
u.
Using LHôpitals rule we also have that
(a  u) = 1 G(a)
g(a)
  1
g(u)[1 G(a)] <
1
g(u)
[1  1
1 G(a) ] < 0 < a  u ;
where the rst inequality again uses logconcavity of 1   F . Therefore by continuity
() =  has a solution between 0 and a  u.
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Online Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3
The number of non-shoppers who need both products is Nb = (1   )2, and the
number of non-shoppers who need only product i, i = 1; 2, is Ni = (1  )(1  ). The
number of shoppers for each product is S = . Henceforth we call these two types of
non-shoppers Nb and Ni respectively. Denote by m(k), k  1, a multiproduct rms per
product prot when there are k multiproduct rms in the market, and by s(k), k  n 1,
a single-product rms prot when there are k multiproduct rms in the market.
We rst consider the simple case where no rms merge or all rms merge.
Claim 1 With all single-product rms (k = 0) or all multiproduct rms (k = n), non-
shoppers search randomly and each rms (per product) prot is respectively
s(0) =
1  
2n
 (2  ) v and m(n) = 1  
n
v :
Proof. With all single-product rms, multiproduct non-shoppers visit a rm ran-
domly and single-product non-shoppers visit a relevant rm randomly,28 so the number
of non-shoppers each rm has is
Nb
2n
+
Ni
n
=
1  
2n
 (2  ) :
This determines each rms prot s(0).
With all multi-product rms, all non-shoppers visit a rm randomly, and so the num-
ber of non-shoppers each rm has at the product level is
Nb
n
+
Ni
n
=
1  
n
 :
This determines each rms per product prot m(n).
We now turn to an asymmetric market structure with 1  k  n   2 such that at
least two pairs of single-product rms remain. (The asymmetric case with k = n  1 will
be treated separately.) We need the following two results from Baye et al. (1992).
Claim 2 (Asymmetric Varian Model) Consider a Varian pricing game where n rms
supply a homogenous product and consumers have identical valuations v. Suppose there
28In equilibrium non-shoppers must search randomly. If they did not, one rm would have more non-
shoppers than another, such that it would charge higher prices and thereby contradict non-shoppers
search behavior. See Section V of Baye et al. (1992) for a formal proof.
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are S > 0 shoppers in the market. Suppose each rm j 2 f1;    ; lg has NA > 0 non-
shoppers and each rm j 2 fl + 1;    ; ng has NB < NA non-shoppers. There is an
equilibrium where the rst l rms use a price distribution FA and the remaining n   l
rms use a price distribution FB, where FA FOSD FB, and if l  n  2 (i.e. if the second
group has at least two rms), FA degenerates at the monopoly price v.
Proof. See Appendix B of Baye et al. (1992).29
Claim 3 (Asymmetric Equilibrium in Symmetric Varian Model) In the Varian
pricing game described in Claim 2 with n  3, if all rms equally share the non-shoppers
(i.e. if NA = NB), then as well as the standard symmetric equilibrium, there exist asym-
metric equilibria where a group of rms j 2 f1;    ; lg, l  n  2, adopt a price distribu-
tion FA with support [p; r][ fvg where r < v, and the rest of the rms j 2 fl+ 1;    ; ng
adopt an atomless price distribution FB with support [p; v]. Moreover, FA FOSD FB, and
FA = FB for p 2 [p; r].
Proof. See Theorem 1 in Baye et al. (1992).30
The following result reports the equilibrium outcome in an asymmetric market with
1  k  n  2.
Claim 4 Suppose 1  k  n   2. (i) If  < k
n
, Nb visit multiproduct rms and Ni
randomize, and (ii) if  > k
n
, Nb randomize and Ni visit single-product rms. All rms
have the same per product prot:
m(k) = s(k) =
(
1 
n
v if  < k
n
1 
2n k(2  )v if  > kn
:
Proof. We rst exclude the possibility that all non-shoppers (i.e. both Nb and Ni)
search in a deterministic way or in a random way. The proof consists of four steps. (i)
It is impossible that all non-shoppers visit multiproduct rms. If that were the case,
the single-product rms would sell only to shoppers and so set price equal to zero. The
multiproduct rms would sell only to non-shoppers and so charge v. This would contradict
the optimality of non-shopperssearch behavior.
29When l  n  3 (i.e., when the second group has at least three rms), there are also equilibria where
the rms in the second group use di¤erent price distributions. In our subsequent analysis, we focus on
the equilibrium stated in the claim.
30When l  2, there also exist asymmetric equilibria where the rms in the rst group use di¤erent
distributions. In our subsequent analysis, we focus on the equilibrium stated in the claim.
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(ii) It is also impossible that all non-shoppers visit single-product rms. If that were
the case, single-product rms would charge higher prices than multiproduct rms in the
sense of FOSD. (If k  2, single-product rms would actually charge the monopoly price.)
But this again would render non-shopperssearch behavior non-optimal.
(iii) It is also impossible that all Nb visit multiproduct rms and all Ni visit single-
product rms supplying product i (except in the edge case Nb
k
= Ni
n k which we ignore).
If that were the case, each multiproduct rm would have Nb
k
non-shoppers per product,
and each single-product rm would have Ni
n k non-shoppers. If
Nb
k
< Ni
n k , then according
to Claim 2 single-product rms would charge higher prices than multiproduct rms. But
then Nis search behavior could not be justied. If
Nb
k
> Ni
n k , then according to Claim 2
multiproduct rms would charge the monopoly price v since k  n   2. But then Nbs
search behavior could not be justied.
(iv) It is also impossible that both Nb and Ni randomize their search behavior. Ni
would randomize only if multiproduct rms and single-product rms supplying product i
provide the same expected consumer surplus from purchasing their product i. But then
Nb would favor visiting a multiproduct rm.
As a result, either Nb or Ni randomize in equilibrium. First, consider an equilibrium
where Ni randomize and Nb visit multiproduct rms. Let X be the probability that Ni
visit a multiproduct rm. Then a single-product rm has (1 X)Ni
n k non-shoppers, and a
multiproduct rm has XNi+Nb
k
non-shoppers per product. They must be equal to each
other, otherwise using Claim 2 one type of rm charges higher prices than the other, and
then Nis search behavior could not be justied. Therefore,
(1 X)Ni
n  k =
XNi +Nb
k
, X = k=n  
1   :
which is only positive if  < k
n
. In this case, one can verify that the number of non-
shoppers each rm has at the product level is 1 
n
. This implies the prot outcome.
Second, consider an equilibrium where Nb randomize and Ni visit single-product rms.
Let X be the probability that Nb visit a multiproduct rm. Then a multiproduct rm
has XNb
k
non-shoppers per product, and a single-product rm has (1 X)Nb
2(n k) +
Ni
n k non-
shoppers. (Notice that those Nb who visit single-product rms will randomly choose one
among 2(n k) of them.) Again, they must be equal to each other, otherwise using Claim
2 either multiproduct rms would charge the monopoly price (which would contradict
Nbs search behavior), or single-product rms would charge higher prices (which would
contradict Nis search behavior). Therefore,
XNb
k
=
(1 X)Nb
2(n  k) +
Ni
n  k , X =
2  
2n=k    :
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which is only less than 1 if  > k
n
. In this case, one can verify that the number of
non-shoppers each rm has at the product level is 1 
2n k(2   ). This implies the prot
outcome.31
Finally, we study the case with k = n 1 such that only one pair of single-product rms
remain in the market. By a similar logic as in the proof of Claim 4, one can show that in
this case it is impossible that all non-shoppers (i.e. both Nb and Ni) visit multiproduct
rms or single-product rms, and it is also impossible that all non-shoppers search in a
random way. The only di¤erence compared to the case with k  n   2 is that now it
is possible that Nb visit multiproduct rms and Ni visit single-product rms supplying
product i. This is because given there is only one pair of single-product rms, with this
conguration of non-shopperssearch behavior multiproduct rms will no longer charge
the monopoly price, and so Nbs search behavior can potentially be justied. Therefore
we now have three possible types of equilibrium to consider.
Before we proceed, it is useful to rst study an asymmetric Varian model where each
of the rst n 1 rms has NA non-shoppers and the last rm has NB < NA non-shoppers.
(This is the case with l = n   1 in Claim 2.) Let FA and FB be the price distributions
used by the two types of rms respectively. FA has a mass point at v, and let  be its
size. Then the two indi¤erence conditions are:
p

NA + S(1  FA (p))n 2(1  FB (p))

= vNA ; (31)
and
p

NB + S(1  FA (p))n 1

= v(NB + S
n 1) : (32)
From the rst condition, we can derive the common lower bound of the two price distri-
butions:
p =
NA
S +NA
v : (33)
Substituting this into the second condition yields
n 1 =
NA  NB
S +NA
: (34)
Then the prot outcome is
A = vNA and B = vNA
S +NB
S +NA
: (35)
31However note that the pricing equilibrium in this case cannot be symmetric. To justify Nbs search
behavior, we need an asymmetric pricing equilibrium where multiproduct rms charge higher prices than
single-product rms. Given k  n   2, this is possible according to Claim 3. In this equilibrium each
rms per product prot is 1 2n k(2  )v. Details of the equilibrium characterization are available upon
request.
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The following result reports the market outcome when k = n  1.
Claim 5 (i) When k = n 1 and   1  1
n
, Nb visit multiproduct rms and Ni randomize,
and each rm has the same per product prot
m(n  1) = s(n  1) = 1  
n
v :
(ii) When k = n   1 and  > 1   1
n
, either Nb visit multiproduct rms and Ni visit
single-product rms, in which case the prot outcome is
m(n  1) = 1  
n  1
2v and s(n  1) = 
2[1  (1  )]
 + (n  1) 
1 
v ; (36)
or Nb randomize and Ni visit single-product rms, in which case the prot outcome is
m(n  1) = X 1  
n  1
2v and s(n  1) =
X2

1  1+X
2
(1  )
X + (n  1) 
1 
v ; (37)
where X 2 (n 1
n+1
2 

; 1) is the probability that Nb visit a multiproduct rm.
Proof. (i) For Nb to visit multiproduct rms and Ni to randomize, all rms must
have the same number of non-shoppers at the product level, otherwiseNis search behavior
could not be justied. This can happen only if Nb
n 1  Ni, or   1   1n . Let X be the
probability that Ni visit a multiproduct rm. Then we need
Nb +XNi
n  1 = (1 X)Ni :
From this one can solve X 2 (0; 1) and verify that each rm has 1
n
(1  ) non-shoppers
per product. This implies the prot result.
(ii) First, consider an equilibrium where Nb visit multiproduct rms and Ni visit
single-product rms. In this case,  > 1   1
n
implies that a multiproduct rm has more
non-shoppers at the product level than a single-product rm (i.e. Nb
n 1 > Ni). Let Fs be
the price distribution used by a single-product rm, and let Fm be the price distribution
used by a multiproduct rm. Then the above general analysis of the asymmetric Varian
model applies with NA =
Nb
n 1 , NB = Ni, FA = Fm, and FB = Fs, since NA > NB. Then
the prot outcome (36) is from (35). For this equilibrium to be sustained, we need
2
Z v
p
(v   p) dFm (p) 
Z v
p
(v   p) dFs (p) : (38)
Second, consider an equilibrium where Nb randomize and Ni visit single-product rms.
This equilibrium can happen only if multiproduct rms charge higher prices. This requires
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that each multiproduct rm has more non-shoppers per product.32 LetX be the probabil-
ity that a multiproduct non-shopper visits a multiproduct rm. Then the above general
analysis of the asymmetric Varian model applies with NA =
XNb
n 1 , NB = Ni+
1
2
(1 X)Nb,
FA = Fm, and FB = Fs, if
NA > NB , X > n  1
n+ 1
2  

: (39)
Then the prot outcome (37) is from (35). For Nb to randomize, we need
2
Z v
p
(v   p) dFm (p) =
Z v
p
(v   p) dFs (p) : (40)
This determines X.
When n = 2, some calculations reveal that (38) holds if and only if   3 2
3 1 , whilst
for  < 3 2
3 1 (40) is satised with X =
1+(1 )(1 )
2(1 ) . It is then straightforward to check
that s(n 1)  m(n) (i.e. the last pair of single-product rms will not choose to merge)
if and only if   
1+
. This proves result (i) in Proposition 3.
Now consider n  3 and prove result (ii) in Proposition 3. Firstly consider   1  1
n
.
In this case we have characterized prots under every possible market structure, and so
using Claims 1, 4, and 5, one can readily verify that the market has dne multiproduct
rms.
Secondly consider  > 1   1
n
. Due to the complexity of the price distributions, in
general it is di¢ cult to derive conditions under which (38) or (40) hold (although one of
them must hold). However as an initial step, we can prove that there will be at least
n   1 multiproduct rms in the market. With  > 1   1
n
, we must have  > k
n
for
1  k  n  2. Then according to Claim 4, when 1  k  n  2, each rms per product
prot is m(k) = s(k) = 1 2n k(2   )v. This is increasing in k. Hence it su¢ ces to
show that s(n  2) < m(n  1). If the prot outcome (36) applies when k = n  1, this
condition becomes
1  
n+ 2
(2  ) < 1  
n  1
2 ,  > 2(n  1)
2n+ 1
;
which is satised because  > 1  1
n
. If the prot outcome (37) applies when k = n  1,
the condition becomes
1  
n+ 2
(2  ) < X 1  
n  1
2 , 2  
n+ 2
< X

n  1 :
32Notice that given k = n   1 Claim 3 does not apply. So if each multiproduct rm has the same
number of non-shoppers as each single-product rm, there is no asymmetric pricing equilibrium where
multiproduct rms charge higher prices.
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which is satised because from equation (39) we know that X > n 1
n+1
2 

.
To determine whether the last pair of single-product rms will merge, we need to
compare s(n   1) with m(n). If the prot outcome (36) applies, then one can check
that s(n 1) < m(n) if and only if  < 1+ . If the prot outcome (37) applies, we do not
have a clear comparison between s(n 1) and m(n), because the X in s(n 1) cannot
be explicitly solved from (40). Therefore to make progress, we consider two extreme cases
with   1 or   0.
When  ! 1 (i.e. as the fraction of non-shoppers vanishes) the multiproduct rms
price distribution Fm degenerates around zero.33 Therefore by continuity for  su¢ ciently
close to 1 condition (38) must hold. (Notice that to make this argument, we do not need
to say anything about the behavior of Fs.) Since  >

1+
we know (from the previous
paragraph) that s(n   1) > m(n) i.e. the last pair of single-product rms will choose
not to merge.
When ! 0 (i.e. as the fraction of shoppers vanishes) both rmsprice distributions
degenerate at the monopoly price,34 and so by continuity have most of their mass around
v when  is su¢ ciently close to zero. Hence it is not clear whether (38) holds or not. If
the prot outcome (36) applies, we already know that s(n  1) < m(n) for  < 1+ . If
the prot outcome (37) applies, without solving X we can also show s(n  1) < m(n).
This is because lim!0 m(n) = 1nv and lim!0 s(n 1) =
 
1  1+X
2


v, and in addition
1  1 +X
2
 <
2
n+ 1

1  
2

<
1
n
where the rst inequality uses the fact that X > n 1
n+1
2 

(from 39), and the second
inequality uses  > 1  1
n
. Hence by continuity, for  su¢ ciently small we have s(n 1) <
m(n). Therefore regardless of whether (38) or (40) applies, the last pair of single-product
rms will choose to merge.
33As  ! 1, both NA and NB go to zero in (32) and (34), while S is strictly positive. Then the
right-hand side of (32) goes to zero. To sustain (32), we must have FA (p)! 1 for any p 2 (0; v).
34As  ! 0, S in (33) goes to zero, while for a given , NA is always bounded away from zero. Then
(33) implies that p converges to the monopoly price v.
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